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Casenotes
BARTLING V. SUPERIOR COURT: THE FINAL
TRANSGRESSION OF A PATIENT'S
RIGHT TO DIE?
INTRODUCTION
In Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center), a California
appellate court reversed a lower court's refusal to permit a terminally ill patient to
exercise his right to die This Note traces the legal history of the right to die and
discusses both decisions in Bartling. The author advocates a uniform standard to
determine when a patient has the right to refuse necessary treatment.
ADVANCES IN medical technology1 have generated a variety oflegal issues in health care.2 For example, the health care system
currently includes an unprecedented number of lifesaving and
lifeprolonging mechanisms.' Because of these advances, the pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment has taken on new signifi-
cance. Both the legal and medical professions are attempting to
interpret the scope of this right, but their various analyses may ulti-
mately conflict.4
The treatment of illness has traditionally been a medical con-
1. Advances in medical technology in the last decade alone include coronary bypasses,
hip replacement surgery, kidney dialysis, magnetic resonance imaging, artificial hearts, organ
transplants, and ultrasound. See Wells, Medical Ultrasonics, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 1984, at
44. These developments are likely to continue.
2. Some of the areas in which law and medicine intersect are involuntary commitment
hearings and medical malpractice cases.
3. The status of modem health care in the legal system may be shown by the dramatic
increase in the number of medical malpractice suits, the size of jury awards, and the cost of
malpractice insurance.
The results of a recent American Medical Association (AMA) study indicate that: (1)
Americans currently are filing more than three times as many medical malpractice claims as
they did in 1975; (2) several hundred of the malpractice awards in the last few years have
exceeded $1 million; and (3) in the last 10 years, malpractice insurance premiums have risen
by 400%-600% to cover the cost of these claims.
As the study notes, patients ultimately bear the cost. At present, the annual cost of the
nation's health care bill has risen to $3.6 billion. At the current rate, the AMA projects that
this figure could exceed $7 billion within three years. See A.M.A. Study Finds Big Rise in
Claims For Malpractice, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 6; An Epidemic of Malpractice
Suits, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1985, at 62.
4. The right to refuse treatment and the right to die are distinguishable. When a pa-
tient requests refusal of medical treatment he may do so knowing that he will die or knowing
that there is only a chance that he may die. Though it is common to use these phrases
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cern, but as technology develops, certain treatment options raise the
legal implications of society's interest in the preservation of lives.
An example of this impact on medical treatment on this interest
arises when a competent adult patient' seeks to exercise his right to
die.6 The outcome in such cases has not been predictable.7
This Note sets forth and discusses the historical development of
patient's right to die.8 It then presents and analyzes the decision in
Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center),9
interchangeably, such a distinction becomes important when attempting to discern the intent
underlying a patient's request. See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
5. "Right-to-die" cases are treated differently when the patient is competent than when
he is incompetent. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. The discussion in this Note
is limited to the right of a competent, adult patient to refuse treatment and the establishment
of a uniform standard for determining the parameters of such a right.
However, the competent-incompetent patient distinction may soon be eliminated in favor
of a right-to-die standard for both categories of patients. This seems to be the intimation of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in its most recent decision involving an incompetent patient's
right to die. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); "Right to Die" In Termi-
nal Cases Widened in Jersey, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
6. A competent patient's decision to exercise his right to die is typically the result of his
reflection on the disease from which he is suffering, his poor medical prognosis, the hardships
and sorrow felt by his family and friends, the unmanageable costs of his health care, and his
own inability or unwillingness to endure. See, eg., infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
Two recent surveys have shown that society now recognizes a terminal patient's right to
die. From June 23-28, 1984, a New York Times-CBS News Poll randomly surveyed approxi-
mately 1,600 Americans, asking the question: "Medical technology now enables doctors to
prolong the lives of many people who are terminally ill. Do you believe doctors should stop
using these techniques if the patient asks, even if that means the patient will die?" Seventy-
seven percent of the people interviewed fully agreed that patients should be allowed to refuse
such treatment. Only 15% of those remaining said "no," and 8% were uncertain. For a
detailed discussion of this survey, see Playing God: Is Unplugging a Life-Sustaining Machine
Murder, Or Is It Allowing Nature To Take Its Course?, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 30,
1984, at 1-C, col. 1.
More recently, a Harris Survey was conducted by telephone between January 24-27, 1985,
shortly after the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down an important right-to-die decision
in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Of the approximately 1,250 adults
questioned in a nationwide cross-section, 85% believed that "a patient with a terminal disease
ought to be able to tell his doctor to let him die rather than to extend his life when no cure is
in sight," while 13% did not. In 1981, only 78% had believed so, while 19% did not. Fur-
ther, 61% agreed that such a patient's wishes should be granted, while 36% disagreed. These
statistics also represented a rise from the 1981 figures of 56% and 41%, respectively. See
Majority FavorsDeath For Terminally I1l Seeking It, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 4, 1985, at
IA, col. 1.
7. Compare Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center), 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984) (competent adult patients have the right to
refuse medical treatment over the objections of their physicians and hospitals), with Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afd 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (com-
petent adult patient's right to refuse artificially life-sustaining treatment qualified by consent
of his family).
8. See infra notes 13-87 and accompanying text.
9. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
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one of the most recent cases in this area of law.' ° Based on Bartling
and its predecessors, this Note advocates adoption of a uniform
standard for determining the scope of a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment. 1 The Note concludes that when a competent
adult patient requests the withholding of necessary medical treat-
ment, that request should be honored, provided that certain findings
and qualifications are met. 2
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
The legally recognized right to die is derived from three interre-
lated sources. The first is the United States Constitution. A right
to die, though not expressly guaranteed, can be derived from the
Constitution, based on the right to privacy. The second source is
judicial process. Although courts have used differing interpretive
schemes, their efforts have led to judicial recognition of a right to
die. The third source is legislative action. As a result of the consti-
tutional arguments supporting a right to die and the inconsistent
judicial interpretations, a number of states have enacted natural
death acts. The effect of this legislation is to provide certain pa-
tients with the right to die. l
3
A. Constitutional Derivation
The United States Constitution does not explicitly provide for a
right to die, nor does it enunciate a right to privacy. However, the
right to privacy has been established, in certain instances, as a pro-
tected legal right based on derivations from constitutional princi-
ples. It is this right which forms the foundation for the right to die
argument.
Early judicial expression of a right to privacy arose from Justice
Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States. 4 In
Olmstead, Justice Brandeis stated that "the right to be let alone"
was among the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion.' 5 Thirty-six years later, in 1964, this position was further ad-
vocated by Judge Burger' 6 in In re President and Directors of
10. See infra notes 88-154 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 155-218 and accompanying text.
12. See part IV, infra.
13. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
14. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
15. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
16. Warren Burger, then a federal judge, and now Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
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Georgetown College, Inc. 17 Judge Burger dissented from the Court
of Appeals' refusal to hear the case en banc and argued that the
right to privacy justified the refusal of ordinary medical treatment
that would otherwise save a patient's life.18
The major impact of the right to privacy arose after the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut 9 that a
constitutional right to privacy exists. In Griswold, the Supreme
Court found that the right to privacy was included in the penumbra
of rights granted by several constitutional amendments 0 and could
be derived from a basic notion of personal intimacy." The Court
noted further that, as with all individual rights, the right to privacy
was not absolute,22 and in each situation, the individual right must
be balanced against the asserted state interest.23
The Supreme Court extended the right to privacy in Roe v.
Wade.24 The Court stated that the "liberty" concept secured by the
fourteenth amendment was the basis of this right.25 It extended the
right to privacy to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
have an abortion.26 The Roe Court warned that the right to privacy
17. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). The Georgetown pro-
ceeding arose from an application for permission to administer blood transfusions to an emer-
gency patient. The court reviewed the entry of an order authorizing a hospital to administer
a blood transfusion to a patient who opposed the procedure on religious grounds, and whose
husband was unwilling to authorize the transfusions. The court found the order proper be-
cause the transfusions were necessary to preserve her life and because the hospital had to
administer the treatment or expose itself to the risk of civil and criminal liability. The patient
was a 25-year-old Jehovah's Witness who was brought to the hospital by her husband for
emergency care after having lost two-thirds of her body's blood supply due to a ruptured
ulcer. She had no personal physician and relied solely on hospital staff. Id. at 1006.
18. Id. at 1017 (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928)). Judge Burger noted that this right even applied to people with "foolish, unrea-
sonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment
even at a great risk." Id. at 1016-17.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. Id. at 482-85. According to the court, various specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights create zones of privacy, including the first, third, fourth, and ninth amendments. Id.
at 484.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 484-86; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1972).
23. In Griswold, the state's interest in regulating the health and welfare of its citizens
was found to be insufficient to overcome the individual right of a married couple to choose
contraceptive methods without state interference. 381 U.S. at 485. State interests may occa-
sionally be held to outweigh individual interests. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was a pregnant, single woman who brought a class action
suit challenging the constitutionality of the criminal abortion laws, which proscribed procur-
ing or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's
life. Id.
25. Id. at 152-53.
26. Id.
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was not absolute and could be curtailed by a demonstration of com-
pelling state interest.27
While the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether an indi-
vidual has a constitutional right to die, a number of state courts
have found that such a right does exist. These decisions are based
on the same constitutional principles which support the right to
privacy.28
B. Judicial Interpretation
Cases concerning an adult patient's right to die generally have
arisen in two distinct fact situations. In the first situation, the pa-
tient is incompetent and a third party either is seeking appointment
as guardian, or already has been appointed and wants a court order
that would enable him to make medical decisions for the patient.29
In the second situation, the patient is competent to make his own
decision.3
The current archetype for cases involving an incompetent pa-
tient's right to die is In re Quinlan.3' Karen Ann Quinlan was a
twenty-two-year-old woman who ingested drugs and alcohol,
stopped breathing, and became comatose. After seeing his daughter
in a vegetative state, supported by a respirator and nourished
27. Id. at 154-56. In noting the limitations of the pregnant mother's right to privacy,
the Court observed that a state "may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in
pregnancy, these interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors
that govern the abortion decision." Id. at 154. See also, Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and
Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REV. 462 (1977).
28. See infra notes 29-68 and accompanying text.
i9. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457
A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), rev'd, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Coyler, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
660 P.2d 738 (1983); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. Summit County 1980); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1977); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, modified sub nom.
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center), 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), affid, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County
Ct. 1978).
31. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1977).
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through a nasogastrointestinal tube, Mr. Quinlan petitioned the
courts for appointment of guardianship for the purpose of removing
the respirator.3 2 Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that Mr. Quinlan should be Karen's guardian and should be permit-
ted to have her respirator removed, even though removal would
likely result in her death.33 In so deciding, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized that there were certain areas of personal privacy
under the Constitution, 4 and that Karen Quinlan's right to choose
could not be disregarded simply because she was unable to decide
for herself.3 The court concluded that these interests in privacy
and the freedom of choice outweighed both the state's interest in the
preservation and the sanctity of human life 6 and the obligations of
the physicians to administer medical treatment.37
A year later the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
adopted a similar approach in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz. 8 Mr. Saikewicz was a profoundly mentally re-
32. See 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The lower court appointed neither Mr. nor Mrs. Quinlan as their
daughter's guardian, because it believed their personal anguish would prevent them from
effectively making day-to-day decisions on the future care and treatment of their daughter.
137 NJ. Super. at 270, 348 A.2d at 824.
33. 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. Though the Superior Court reviewed the same
factors as did the Chancery Court, it deemed Mr. Quinlan capable of full guardianship be-
cause "his strength of purpose and character" far outweighed his feelings of grief and sorrow,
and thus qualified him eminently. The court noted, however, that the decision to discontinue
life support would require the consensus of "the guardian and family of [the patient], the
responsible attending physicians and the hospital's ethics committee." Id. at 53-55, 355 A.2d
at 671-72.
Karen Ann Quinlan survived removal of the respirator, but remained in a coma. She died
on June 11, 1985. Karen Quinlan Dead, Prompted Right-to-Die Fight, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, June 12, 1985 at 1-A, col. 5.
34. 70 NJ. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. The court stated that the right to privacy discussed
in Griswold and Roe was "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances in much the same way as it is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's right to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions." Id.
35. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
36. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court found that the state interest in the preserva-
tion and sanctity of human life diminishes as the magnitude of the bodily invasion involved in
the treatment increases, and the prognosis becomes worse. Finding Quinlan's prognosis ex-
tremely poor and the bodily invasion great, the court concluded that her right of independent
choice must prevail over the state's interest in preserving life. Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-
64.
37. Id. at 45, 355 A.2d at 665. The physicians decided to terminate the use of the respi-
rator. The court noted that in an action for declaratory relief it had the "nondelegable judi-
cial responsibility" to review the doctors' decision to preserve underlying human values and
rights. The court, in effect, found that the state interest in defending the physician's right was
not sufficiently compelling to override the patient's right to privacy. Id. at 45-51, 355 A.2d at
665-69.
38. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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tarded resident of a state mental health facility who suffered from
acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia.39 The court held that all
persons, whether competent or incompetent, have a right to refuse
medical treatment in certain circumstances, and allowed Mr.
Saikewicz's guardian ad litem to refuse chemotherapy on behalf of
his ward.4' The Saikewicz court's conclusion was based on its ap-
plication of the Quinlan court's approach to the constitutional right
to privacy. 4 Four factors were critical to the court's reasoning. It
balanced the patient's interest in bodily integrity and privacy
against the state's interests in the preservation of life, the protection
of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the mainte-
nance of the moral integrity of the medical profession.42 Thus, like
Quinlan, the Saikewicz court recognized the right to privacy and
then balanced the competing interests in question.
In re Quackenbush4 3 was one of the first cases in which a court
applied the Quinlan/Saikewicz decisional framework to a compe-
tent patient's request to be permitted to die. Mr. Quackenbush was
a divorced, seventy-two-year-old recluse who had no children and
suffered from gangrene in both legs.' Doctors advised him that,
unless his legs were amputated, he would die within three weeks.
Mr. Quackenbush refused to consent to the operation.4" The hospi-
tal petitioned the court for an appointment of guardianship for the
purpose of authorizing surgery, alleging that the patient was incom-
petent to make an informed decision.46
The court found Mr. Quackenbush competent47 and considered
39. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
40. Id. at 745, 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 427, 432. The court stated further that "[t]he
recognition of that right must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent,
patient because the value of human dignity extends to both." Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
41. Id. at 739-40, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
42. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. One of the first decisions to emphasize these interests
was In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
43. 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978).
44. Id. at 284, 383 A.2d at 786-87.
45. Id. at 284, 383 A.2d at 786. When treatment was attempted, Quackenbush refused
and became rambunctious and belligerent. The hospital tried to send him away because of
his refusal of treatment, but ultimately admitted him when all agencies of transport refused to
take him home. Id.
46. Id. at 283, 383 A.2d at 786.
47. Id. at 288, 383 A.2d at 788. See also Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (1978). In Lane, the patient refused to consent to surgical amputation of her
right leg which was infected with gangrene. The Lane court held that the irrationality of the
patient's decision did not justify a conclusion that her capacity was impaired to the point of
legal incompetence to engage in decisionmaking. Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235-36.
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only whether there were any compelling state interests sufficient to
override his right to die. The court held that the state's interest in
preserving life was, in this instance, insufficient to compel the exten-
sive invasion of privacy presented by a forced surgical procedure.48
The court reached this conclusion despite doctors' testimony that
the operation could have arrested the spread of gangrene.49
A similar conclusion was reached by the Florida Court of Ap-
peals in Satz v. Perlmutter."0 Mr. Perlmutter was a seventy-three-
year-old man who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, com-
monly called "Lou Gehrig's disease."'" Mr. Perlmutter, competent
and mentally alert, decided that he no longer wished to be attached
to a respirator.5 2 He was aware of the inevitable result of his deci-
sion and tried unsuccessfully to remove the respirator himself.53
Despairing at his own prognosis, he exclaimed that removal of the
respirator could not "be worse than what I'm going through
now."5 4 Relying on Saikewicz, the Satz court held that, based upon
his constitutional right to privacy, Mr. Perlmutter had the right to
discontinue use of the mechanical respirator.55 The court analyzed
the case in light of the four state interests enumerated in Saikewicz,
but found none of them compelling.5 6 The court limited its adop-
tion of Saikewicz, however, to situations where the patient is capa-
ble of making his own decision, recognizing the complications
inherent in cases where the patient is incompetent.5 7
The capacity for self-determination in medical treatment deci-
sionmaking was a central issue for the Massachusetts Court of Ap-
peals in Lane v. Candura.5 8 Mrs. Candura, a seventy-seven-year-
old widow who refused to consent to the surgical removal of her
right foot, previously had consented to the amputation of other por-
48. 156 N.J. Super. at 290, 383 A.2d at 789 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355
A.2d 647, 664 (1976)); see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
49. 156 N.J. Super. at 286, 383 A.2d at 787.
50. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affid 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). In
Perlmutter, the State appealed from a trial court order permitting the removal of the artificial
life sustaining device. By the time the case reached the Florida Court of Appeals, the patient
was virtually incapable of movement, unable to breathe without a respirator and certain to
die in a very short time. 362 So. 2d at 160-61. The patient ultimately died before the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision in toto. 379 So. 2d at 360.
51. 362 So. 2d at 161.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. This statement was conveyed to the trial judge at a bedside hearing. Id.
55. Id. at 162.
56. Id. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
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tions of her foot in efforts to halt the spread of gangrene. 59 How-
ever, when informed that the disease had spread to her whole foot
and would warrant its removal, she balked, consented twice to the
operation, then later revoked her consent. 60 Ultimately, she con-
cluded that she would welcome death before enduring what she felt
would be an ineffective surgical procedure. 6'
Alleging that her mother was incompetent, Mrs. Candura's
daughter petitioned for and received from the trial court an order
appointing her temporary guardian with the power to consent to the
surgery.62 The court of appeals reversed the order, holding that the
evidence presented did not justify a finding of legal incompetence.63
It accepted testimony to the effect that Mrs. Candura's judgment
was somewhat affected by her slight senility and occasional depres-
sion. Despite this evidence, the court of appeals asserted that in-
competence could not be found absent evidence that the patient's
"areas of forgetfulness and confusion cause, or relate in any way to
impairment of her ability to understand that in rejecting the ampu-
tation she is, in effect, choosing death over life."'
These cases demonstrate the evolution of judicial evaluation in
the treatment of right-to-die issues. They suggest that there are
generally recognized circumstances in which courts will uphold the
right to refuse medical treatment.65 The decisions have been criti-
cized, however, as inconsistent and arbitrary.66 While some courts
have set forth specific right-to-die guidelines, others simply have de-
termined the existence of this right by implication.67 Confronted
with this inconsistency, a number of courts have spoken out for leg-
islative assistance in this area.68
59. Id. at 379, 376 N.E.2d at 1233-34.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 378, 376 N.E.2d at 1233.
63. Id. at 380, 376 N.E.2d at 1234. The court of appeals noted that the judgment of the
trial court and that of the psychiatrist were based on the medical irrationality of Candura's
decision, and that her competency had not been questioned until she refused the surgery. Id.
at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235.
64. Id. at 384, 376 N.E.2d at 1236. The court of appeals went on to say that the deci-
sion, regardless of its wisdom, was "not the uninformed decision of a person incapable of
appreciating the nature and consequences of her act." Id. The Lane decision makes it clear
that special care must be taken in rejecting a patient's decision by a finding of incompetence.
65. See supra note 6.
66. Brown, Therefore Choose Death, HUM. RTs. Fall 1987, at 38, 44.
67. Id.
68. In fact, some courts have questioned whether they have the power to decide such
issues. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360-61 (Fla. 1980).
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C. Legislative Response
The legislative response to judicial treatment of right-to-die
cases has varied from state to state.69 Thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia have enacted right-to-die statutes.7" In 1984,
forty-seven "right-to-die" bills were introduced in twenty-five legis-
latures.71 The first such legislation was California's Natural Death
Act.7
2
Enacted in 1976, the California Natural Death Act combined an
individual's constitutionally protected right to privacy under Cali-
fornia state law73 with the legislature's belief that patients have the
69. Although such legislation was recently enacted in the United States, some sources
have traced its roots to England in the 1930's. See Comment, The Right to Die A Natural
Death and the Living Will, 13 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 99, 110-11 (1982) (citing Survey, Eutha-
nasia: Criminal Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
1202, 1252-53 (1973); Louisell, Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 22
CATH. U.L. REV. 723, 725-26 (1973)).
70. Alabama Natural Death Act, §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); Arkansas Death with Dig-
nity Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1983); California Natural Death Act,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985); Delaware Death with Dig-
nity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death
Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1984); Florida Life Prolonging
Procedure Act, 1984 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 84-58 (West); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Supp. 1984); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1984); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 7, 110 §§ 701-710,
(Smith-Hurd 1984); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-109 (1979);
Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures, LA. REV. STAT. ANN., 40:1299.58.1-. 10 (West Supp.
1984); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life Saving Mechanisms, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101
to -121 (Supp. 1984); Nevada Witholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures, NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1983); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-
7-1 to -11 (1978); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320
to -323 (1979 & Supp. 1981); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness, OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983); Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h (Vernon Supp. 1984); Vermont Terminal Care Document, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1984); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1-:12 (Supp.
1984); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp.
1985); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA. CODE, §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Supp. 1984);
Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1984); Wyo-
ming Act, Wy. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (1984).
Twelve states have passed legislation in 1985. Arizona, H.R. 2029 (1985); Colorado,
H.R. 2027 (1985); Indiana, H.R. 1075 (1985); Iowa, S. 725 (1985); Maine, L. 1448 (1985);
Maryland, H.R. 453 (1985); Missouri, S. 51 (1985); Montana, H.R. 228 (1985); New Hamp-
shire, H.R. 47 (1985); Oklahoma, H.R. 765 (1985); Tennessee, H.R. 386 (1985); and Utah, S.
103 (1985).
A right-to-die bill, S. 67, has been passed by both houses in Connecticut, but has not yet
been signed as of this writing.
71. 1984 Right to Die Bills, Newsletter From Society for the Right to Die, May 12, 1984
(On file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985).
73. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and ... pursuing and obtaining ... privacy." CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 1.
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"fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the render-
ing of their own medical care, including the decision to have life
saving procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal
condition. ' 74 The Act specifies a procedure whereby a qualified pa-
tient may direct his physician to withhold or withdraw life sus-
taining medical care in the event of a terminal condition.75 This
Act also prescribes the procedure by which the qualified adult may
execute a written directive,76 binding on the physician, 7 which pro-
vides that, in the event that death becomes "imminent," life sus-
taining procedures will be withheld or removed and the individual
will be permitted to die naturally.78
The drafters of the Act anticipated difficulties in its interpreta-
tion, and with these difficulties in mind they included two very im-
portant provisions. The first provides that the directive executed by
a competent adult will be considered "the final expression of [his]
legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and [he will] ac-
cept the consequences of such a refusal."'79 The second is that the
physician, health care facility, or licensed health professional, under
the direction of a physician who participated in the withholding or
withdrawing of life sustaining procedures in accordance with the
Act, cannot be subject to civil action, criminal liability, or charges
of unprofessional conduct.80 The Natural Death Act also states
that any action taken in accordance with its provisions is not con-
sidered suicide.81 The Act provides that the procurement of life or
health insurance may not be invalidated or impaired by the patient's
signing a directive under the Act,82 and that no health care provider
or insurer may require a person to sign a directive as a condition for
insurance or for receipt of health care services.83 The Act con-
cludes by stating that in no instance does it condone "mercy
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1985).
75. Id. Section 7187 provides relevant definitions for this Act. The basis for the Act
was the legislative finding that the artificial prolongation of life by modem medical technol-
ogy may result in loss of patient dignity and produce unnecessary pain and suffering. Id. at
§ 7186.
76. Id. at § 7188.
77. Id. at § 7191(b).
78. Id. at § 7188.
79. Id.
80. Id. at § 7190. In fact, the physician would be liable for unprofessional conduct for
failure to follow a binding directive. Id. at § 7191(b).
81. Id. at § 7192(a).
82. Id. at § 7192(b).
83. Id. at § 7192(c).
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killings." 4
The California Natural Death Act has provided the impetus for
similar legislation in other states. s5 Though it has been criticized as
constitutionally defective 6 and problematic, 7 it has not been
amended since its passage.
II. THE BARTLING DECISION 88
When William Bartling expressed his wish to refuse medical
treatment, the California Natural Death Act was already in effect.
When he first stated that he would prefer living without the life
sustaining machines, the competent adult patient's right to die had
been legally recognized and upheld by a number of other courts.
Yet, his petition to the California Superior Court for permission to
exercise his right to die was denied. 9
A. Background
At the time of his death, Mr. Bartling was a seventy-year-old
man who suffered from emphysema, chronic respiratory failure, ar-
teriosclerosis, an abdominal aneurysm, and a malignant lung tu-
mor." He also had a history of depression and alcoholism.9" On
April 8, 1984, he entered Glendale Adventist Medical Center for
treatment of his depression. During the course of a routine physical
examination, the physicians discovered a tumor in his lung and they
performed a biopsy which caused the lung to collapse. 92 The treat-
ing physicians were unable to reinflate his lung because of an em-
84. Id. at § 7195.
85. Several states' Natural Will Acts are similar to California's, including those in Ala-
bama, Arkansas and New Mexico. See supra note 70.
86. See Comment, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Right to the California
Natural Death Act, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 988-90 (1980) (suggesting that the Act is
unconstitutional because it is underinclusive, vague and ambiguous, and because it subjects
the right to die to unfettered physician discretion).
87. See Comment, A Proposed Amendment to the California Natural Death Act to Assure
the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 579,
600-05 (1983) (indicating five separate situations where the Act makes it more difficult to die
naturally).
88. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, No. C 500735 (Cal. Super. Ct. June
22, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Bartling I], rev'd sub nom Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale
Adventist Medical Center), 163 Cal. App. 3d -, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Bartling II].
89. Barding I, No. C 500735 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22, 1984).
90. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d -, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221 (Ct. App. 1984).
91. Id.
92. Id.
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
physemic condition which hindered healing.93 In addition to a
prescribed regimen of antibiotics, a tracheotomy was performed,
and Mr. Bartling was placed on a ventilator.9 4 Mr. Bartling re-
mained on the ventilator until his death; efforts to "wean" him from
the machine were unsuccessful.95
After Mr. Bartling had attempted to remove his ventilator tubes
several times, the physicians placed him in "soft restraints."' 96 De-
spite requests from both Mr. Bartling and his wife, Glendale Ad-
ventist and the treating physicians refused to remove either the
ventilator or the restraints.97
In June, the Bartlings filed suit, seeking damages98 and an in-
junction restraining the hospital and its physicians, the real parties,
from providing any medical care without Mr. Bartling's consent
and from "forcing [him] to undergo mechanical breathing through
the ventilator." 99 The Bartlings submitted a number of documents
in support of their claim. Appended to the complaint were: (1) a
"living will' signed by Mr. Bartling and properly witnessed;' 0 '
(2) a personal, present declaration from the patient requesting that
the court grant the order;"0 2 and (3) a "Durable Power of Attorney
93. Id.
94. Id. A tracheotomy is a vertical incision made in the interior wall of the trachea to
overcome obstructions. NEw AMERICAN POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 298 (N. Roper
ed. 1978). A ventilator, also known as a respirator, is a mechanical device which is used to
assist patients whose lungs are too weak to breathe under their own power. Appellee's Brief
at 21, Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, No. C 500735 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22,
1984), rev'd sub nom. Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical Center), 163
Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Appellee's Brief].
95. Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d at-, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221. "Weaning" is the process
by which the gradual removal of a patient from a ventilator is attempted. Appellee's Brief,
supra note 94, at 22.
96. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. A living will permits an individual to state in advance his wishes regarding the
use of life-sustaining procedures. It also provides for the appointment of another person to
make health care decisions if the individual is unable to do so. CONCERN FOR DYING, AN
EDUCATIONAL CONCERN, CONCERN FOR DYING, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT THE
LIVING WILL (1984).
Mr. Bartling's "living will" stated in part that "at such time the situation should arise in
which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental
disability, I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications, artificial
means or heroic measures." Bartling I1, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
101. Id.
102. Id. Mr. Bartling's declaration stated, in relevant part:
While I have no wish to die, I find intolerable the living conditions forced upon me
by my deteriorating lungs, heart and blood vessel systems, and find intolerable my
being continuously connected to this ventilator, which sustains my every breath and
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for Health Care," appointing Mrs. Bartling as the attorney-in-
fact.1"3 The Bartling family also executed declarations in support of
their contentions," and documents which would release the hospi-
tal and its doctors from liability should they agree to honor Mr.
Bartling's wishes. 105 The court also viewed the videotape of Mr.
Bartling's deposition,'0 6 taken the day before the Superior Court
hearing. In that deposition he indicated that he wished to live de-
tached from the ventilator, and that he understood that he might
die if it were removed. 107
my life for the past six and one-half weeks. Therefore, I wish this Court to order
that the sustaining of my respiration by this mechanical device violates my constitu-
tional right, is contrary to my every wish, and constitutes a battery upon my person.
I fully understand that my request to have the ventilator removed and discontinued,
which I frequently made to my wife and to my doctors, will very likely cause respir-
atory failure and ultimately lead to my death. I am willing to accept that risk rather
than to continue the burden of this artificial existence which I find unbearable, de-
grading and dehumanizing. I also suffer a great deal of pain and discomfort because
of being confined to this bed, being on this ventilator, and from other problems
which are occurring.
Id.
103. Id. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act provides that a proxy can
be designated as attorney-in-fact to make health care decisions in the event that the principal
should become incompetent to make such decisions. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2443 (West
Supp. 1985). In the document he executed, Mr. Bartling expressed his desires concerning his
future medical and supportive care.
I am totally unable to care for myself, and believe that I am dependent on a
mechanical ventilator to support and sustain my respirator and life. I continuously
suffer agonizing discomfort, pain and the humiliating indignity of having to have
my every bodily need and function tended to by others. I do not wish to continue to
live under these conditions. It is therefore my intent to refuse to continue on venti-
lator support and thereby to permit the natural process of dying to occur-peace-
fully, privately and with dignity. I direct my attorney-in-fact to honor my desires in
this regard, and to refuse ventilator support, at such time as I am unable to do so for
myself. I am aware that impairment, incapacity and unconsciousness may occur as
a result of my refusal of ventilation, but I desire that none of these be deemed to be
a medical emergency.
Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
104. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.
105. Id.
106. Id. at _, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. Beyond its use for evidentiary purposes, Mr.
Bartling's deposition was also videotaped for subsequent transmission on the CBS program
"60 Minutes," Sept. 23, 1984. A transcript of this program segment is on file at the Case
Western Reserve Law Review [hereinafter cited as Bartling Transcripts].
107. Bartling Transcripts, supra note 106, at 4-5.
In relevant part, Mr. Bartling's deposition provided the following communication:
SCOTT (Bartling's Attorney): Mr. Bartling, we're now going to do this deposition
which I explained to you this morning. Do you understand that you have an obli-
gation to tell the truth? (Bartling nodding head) Is that a yes? Okay. You need to
nod your head so this girl . . . can see you. Mr. Bartling, do you want to live?
(Nodding head yes) Do you want to continue to live on that ventilator? (Nodding
head no) Do you understand that if that ventilator is discontinued or taken away,
that you might die? (Nodding head yes) All right. I have no further questions.
GINSBURG (Defendant's Attorney): Mr. Bartling, are you satisfied with the care
that the nurses have been giving you here at Glendale? (Nodding head yes) That's
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Despite these strong and unequivocal statements, Mr. Bartling's
treating physicians continued to refuse his request to remove either
the ventilator or the restraints.108 There were several factors upon
which the physicians based their decision. It was their belief that
Mr. Bartling's illness was not terminal and that he could live for at
least a year if he were weaned from the ventilator.'0 9 They ques-
tioned his decisionmaking because his vacillation suggested an in-
ability to make a meaningful decision." 0 They further believed that
honoring Mr. Bartling's request would constitute insupportable, un-
ethical conduct on their part,"' and would raise the possibility of
criminal and civil liability."12
The Bartlings' motion for a preliminary injunction was argued
before the California Superior Court.113 At the outset of this pro-
ceeding, the court established that the scope of discussion would be
confined to four areas: statutory and "decisional" law, medical
prognosis, competency, and the nature of relief requested." 4
Addressing each of these issues in turn, the court first summa-
rily dismissed the applicability of the California Natural Death
Act.' It interpreted this Act to provide that before its terms could
apply, the patient must be deemed terminally ill. Since Mr.
Bartling's physicians had testified that they would be able to remove
the ventilator, the court concluded that his condition was not termi-
nal. 6 Similarly, it said that there was no case under United States
law in which a person applying for injunctive relief was not in a
comatose, vegetative, or brain dead state." 7 Accordingly, the court
a yes. . .. And you're not in any pain, are you? (Nodding no) Okay. And-and
you don't want to die, do you? (Nodding head no) And you-you do understand
that if that ventilator is removed, that you might die? (Nodding yes) I have no
further questions.
Bartling Transcripts, supra note 106, at 4-5.
108. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
109. Id. at -, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 223. Mr. Bartling's physicians did, however, concede
that his treatment would not likely be successful. Id.
110. Id. This opinion was based on the declarations of several nurses who related in-
stances in which the ventilator tube accidentally detached and Mr. Bartling "signalled franti-
cally" for them to reconnect it. Id. According to staff testimony, Mr. Bartling also made
several statements to the effect that he wanted to live, not to have the ventilator disconnected.
Id.
I 11. Id. Glendale Adventist viewed itself as "a Christian hospital devoted to the preser-
vation of life." Id.
112. Id.
113. Bartling I No. C 500735 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22, 1984).
114. Id. at 5-7.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 6.
117. Id. at 5. The court viewed all the cases cited by counsel as requiring a poor progno-
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reasoned that if the "medical community" determines that a patient
is not terminally ill, and there is some potential for restoring that
patient to a "cognitive and sapient life," then any petition for in-
junctive relief from the hospital's life sustaining procedures should
be refused. 1 8 Based on these and other factual findings, the court
asserted its belief that Mr. Bartling's prognosis was "guarded and
cautious, but optimistic."'1' 9 Further, from the evidence presented,
it found Mr. Bartling legally competent.12 0 Finally, interpreting the
request for injunctive relief as one for a mandatory injunction, the
court pointed out that the California courts disfavor such injunction
requests and seldom grant them.12 ' The court thus indicated that
its tentative inclination would be to refuse the Bartlings' petition.1
22
The Bartlings argued four points in an attempt to dissuade the
court from its stated inclination. First, California's Natural Death
Act was relevant to the disposition of the present case because it
evidenced the legislature's understanding that patients have the
right to withdraw unwanted life sustaining medical care. 123
Although the Act provides that terminal illness is one basis for the
exercise of that right, it explicitly states that this is not the exclusive
criterion. Second, the court's summary of relevant precedent was
overly broad and inaccurate.1 24  Not every case cited involved
chronic vegetative, comatose, or totally incompetent patients. Even
so, all courts which have decided cases dealing with incompetent
patients who were permanently comatose or in a persistent vegeta-
tive state have determined that the person's "substitute judgment-
maker is permitted to make a decision because the patient, if com-
sis and evidencing little chance for recovery for injunctive relief to be granted. Further, ac-
cording to the court, the medical testimony in these cases stated unequivocally that "the
petitioners had no possible hope for recovery, and that if not legally dead, they were medi-
cally dead in every sense of the word, and the court was asked to have the physicians or the
hospital withdraw life-sustaining treatment so that the natural process of life and death would
occur." Id.
118. Id. at 6-7.
119. Id. at 2.
120. I.
121. Id. at 4. The court highlighted two other procedural matters relevant to the case.
First, the plaintiff had asked for immediate and equitable relief well in advance of the trial
date, and therefore assumed that additional discovery would be required. Second, the plain-
tiff's burden of proof in a preliminary injunction hearing, under state law, was irreparable
injury, and that injunctive relief was designed to preserve the status quo in order that the
parties might ultimately proceed to trial. Id. at 3-4.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 9.
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petent, . . . could make that same decision." '125 Third, while the
court interpreted the medical prognosis to be continuously or
guardedly optimistic, the record depositions and declarations were
"replete with hopelessness," since multiple prior attempts to wean
Mr. Bartling from the ventilator had been unsuccessful and his
prognosis was poor.'26 Finally, Mr. Bartling's counsel summarized
his petition as one which requested that Mr. Bartling, as a compe-
tent individual, be placed back in the "position of power" and that
he be given the "key of self-control," in accordance with California
law. 127
Notwithstanding these arguments, the court denied the peti-
tion. 128 In so ruling, however, it granted the Bartlings' request that
the order from the preliminary injunction hearing be stipulated as a
permanent injunction, thereby facilitating the expedition of the ap-
pellate process.12
9
B. The California Court of Appeals Decision
On November 6, 1984, two days after lapsing into a coma, Wil-
liam Bartling died of complications suffered due to kidney failure.
At the time of his death, Mr. Bartling was still attached to a ventila-
tor.130 Twenty-three hours later, the California Court of Appeals
determined that the potential for recurrence of the issues presented
in this case was sufficient to warrant judicial review and the estab-
lishment of a workable standard to guide both the medical and legal
professions when faced with similar situations in the future. 3'
Upon completion of its review of the record, the court con-
cluded that the lower court erred when it held that the right to have
life support equipment disconnected was limited to comatose, ter-
minally ill patients, or representatives acting on their behalf.' 32 Ac-
cordingly, the court stated that
125. Id. It may be inferred that since Mrs. Bartling had a durable power of attorney for
the health care of her husband, she should have been allowed to substitute her judgment for
his. But if her judgment would have been the same as her husband's, then the court would
still have been faced with the same problem.
126. Id. at 10.
127. Id. at 11-13. The petitioner cited two California cases in support of this argument,
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. App. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), and Barber v. Superior Court,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
128. Bartling I, No. C 500735 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22, 1984), at 43.
129. Id. at 45.
130. After Death-Court Will Hear Man's Right-to-Die Case, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Nov. 9, 1984, at B-l, col. 1.
131. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
132. Id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. See also Arguing the Right to Die, Newsweek, Jan.
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[I]f the right of the patient to self-determinations as to his own
medical treatment is. . . to have any meaning at all, it must be
paramount to the interests of the patient's hospital and doctors.
The right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment is a
constitutionally guaranteed right which must not be abridged. 133
The court applied a two-part analysis in its assessment of the
Bartling decisions. First, the court considered whether Mr.
Bartling was legally competent to decide to remove the ventila-
tor.13 4 Based on its review of the facts, the court unequivocally es-
tablished that Mr. Bartling was legally competent to make this
determination. The declarations and executed statements which
had been submitted to the trial court indicated that he knew he
would die if the ventilator were disconnected. Nevertheless, he pre-
ferred death to a life sustained by mechanical means.135 His peri-
odic wavering from this position, whether the result of severe
depression or any other factor, did not justify the real parties' con-
clusion that his capacity to make such a decision was impaired to
the point of legal incompetency. 136 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on Lane v. Candura,137 a Massachusetts case involving
a patient whose choice to forego amputation of her leg was tanta-
mount to choosing death. In Lane, the court's determination of in-
competency had not hinged on the rationality of her decision.13 8
The court found that despite evidence of depression and senility, she
fully appreciated the consequences of her ultimate choice, and her
vacillation could be explained by the emotional nature of the deci-
sion, her choice not to communicate with certain doctors, and an
occasional weakening of her resolve to give consent. 39
In the second part of its analysis, the California appellate court
applied a balancing test to determine whether Mr. Bartling's right
to refuse unwanted treatment as a competent adult was outweighed
by state, hospital, or physicians' interests. 14° The court focused on
the patient's right to refuse medical treatment in light of case law,
7, 1985, at 18 (discussing the Bartling case and the right to die); Patient May Refuse Life-
Support Care, Court on Coast Says, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
133. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
134. Id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
135. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
136. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24 (citing Lane v.
Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978)).
137. Lane, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232. See supra notes 58-61 and accompa-
nying text.
138. Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235-36.
139. Id. at 382, 376 N.E.2d at 1235.
140. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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statutory provisions, and the state and federal constitutions. The
court asserted that the right of a competent adult patient to self-
determination in the context of medical treatment was first judi-
cially recognized in 1972, 14' and recently reaffirmed by the Califor-
nia courts.1 42  Legislative recognition of this right for qualified
adults began with the enactment of the California Natural Death
Act in 1976143 and had been supplemented by legislation specifically
concerning patients' rights.'" The court pointed out that the right
of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment is specifically
guaranteed by the California Constitution 4 ' and has been judicially
derived from the United States Constitution.1 46 Thus, the court
concluded that an individual's constitutionally guaranteed right to
privacy provides a competent adult patient with the freedom to re-
ject or refuse consent to medical treatment.147
The free exercise of Mr. Bartling's rights were balanced against
the interests asserted by Glendale Adventist Medical Center and its
physicians. These interests included the preservation of life, the
prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of the ethical integrity of
141. Id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
142. Id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (citing Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983)). In Barber, the court held that two physicians who were
prosecuted for the alleged murder of an incurably ill patient under their care were not crimi-
nally liable for the patient's demise. The Barber court pointed out that while the California
Natural Death Act was specifically addressed to a limited number of individuals, the legisla-
ture recognized a general right of self-determination in medical treatment. Barber, 147 Cal.
App. 3d at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The court in Bartling I agreed that the Act applies
to a limited number of individuals, that is, to terminally ill patients. This class of individuals
is further limited by the specific requirements of the statute.
Mr. Bartling did not meet all of these requirements. In the declaration attached to his
amended complaint, he stated:
My attorney has explained the provisions of the 'California Natural Death Act'; I
understand that I am not a 'qualified patient' under those provisions in that I have
not had a written diagnosis of 'terminal illness' submitted to me two weeks ago, or
at any time. I do not wish to wait two weeks to become a 'qualified patient' before
proceeding with my earnest desire to have the ventilator disconnected.
Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Whether or not Mr. Bartling met
the statutory requirements, the Act was relevant to the analysis of the case because it demon-
strates the legislature's belief that a competent adult does have the right to refuse medical
treatment.
143. Bartling 11, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224; see supra notes 72-84 and
accompanying text.
144. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1985)); see supra notes 19-
23 and accompanying text.
147. Bartling II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (citing Superintendent of
Belchertown School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977)); see supra
notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
[Vol1. 35:764
BARTLING V SUPERIOR COURT
the medical profession.14 Though it acknowledged that preserva-
tion of life was the primary concern of the hospital, the physicians,
and the profession, the court determined that this interest was su-
perseded by Mr. Bartling's interest in self-determination. 149 Fur-
ther, the court declined recognition of the real parties' asserted
interest in preventing suicide as the disconnecting of Mr. Bartling's
ventilator would simply hasten his inevitable death by natural
causes.' 5°  The court established that because death by natural
causes was imminent, disconnection of the ventilator would not hin-
der the state's interest in preventing suicide. 5 Finally, the court
determined that the real parties' fear of criminal or civil liability for
complying with Mr. Bartling's request was unfounded. It was satis-
fied that the case law concerning this issue clearly indicated that,
had Mr. Bartling lived, the real parties would not have been held
criminally or civilly liable for carrying out his instructions.' 52
The court urged that, in the future, parties facing similar
problems should be free to act according to a patient's instruction
without fear of liability and without advance court approval.153 In
closing, the court quoted Quinlan and stated that:
[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in pursuit of their voca-
tion, from all possible contamination by self-interest or self-pro-
tection concerns which would inhibit their independent medical
judgments for the well-being of their dying patients. We would
hope that this opinion might be servicable to some degree in ame-
liorating the professional problems under discussion."'
148. Barding II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
149. Id.
150. Id. at-, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The court cited In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647 (1976), cert. denied sub norm Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1977), in support of
this distinction. In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey court observed "a real distinction between
the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life-support or
radical surgery, for instance, in the face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent death."
70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.
151. Barding II, 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
152. Id.
153. Id. at - & n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226 & n.8. The court noted that had Mr. Bartling
lived past the date of its decision, it would have issued a mandatory injunction permitting Mr.
Bartling to remove the ventilator and leave the hospital without interference from the staff.
Id. at - n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.8. The court also stated its belief that prior judicial
approval would not be needed in future cases. Id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
154. Id. at _, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at
668 (1976)).
The Glendale Adventist Medical Center has recently returned to the California appellate
court. This time it is requesting that a directive be issued which would allow private hospitals
to transfer "ambivalent" terminally ill patients who request to exercise their right to die to
state institutions. It had asserted in Bartling that even if the court ordered the removal of the
respirator, as a state agency it could not compel a private institution to comply. It main-
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III. AVOIDING FUTURE INTERFERENCE - A CALL FOR A
UNIFORM STANDARD OF REVIEW
Prior to Bartling, few courts were able to articulate an accepta-
ble method of determining whether any adult patient should be per-
mitted to exercise his right to die. 5 Consequently, when faced
with similar factual situations, courts questioned their own capacity
to adjudicate such issues.156 The Bartling decision helped to resolve
this dilemma, since courts can now rely on its two-part analysis for
guidance in deciding cases where competent adult patients assert
their right to die.157
A. The Determination of Competency
The first part under the Bartling analysis requires a determina-
tion of whether an individual is competent to exercise his right to
self-determination. Competency is traditionally defined as the ca-
pacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
one's actions."5 8 The law presumes that every adult is capable of
making decisions for himself unless adjudged incompetent. In the
medical context, the law looks to the effectiveness of patient partici-
pation in health care decisionmaking15 9 and requires legally effec-
tive informed consent. There are three traditional elements of
informed consent: the patient's capacity to make particular deci-
sions, the voluntariness of his decisionmaking, and the physician's
tained that the court's discretion in this matter was limited to ordering that the patient be
transferred to a state-run institution where the court-ordered removal could be carried out.
See Hospital Bids For Approval To Transfer Terminally Ill, Am. Med. News, Feb. 1, 1985, at
11, col. 1.
155. See supra notes 31-64 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 68.
157. The two-part Bartling standard will have the greatest practical application if it re-
flects the perspectives of the individuals most likely to use it: doctors and lawyers. For a
discussion combining legal guidelines and insights of medical practitioners, see volumes I and
III of PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
(1982) [hereinafter cited as MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS], and DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983).
158. See Annas & Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy vs
Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1984). The law presumes that every competent
adult is capable of making decisions for himself unless adjudged otherwise. Id. at 565; see
also I MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 56.
159. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 55. In its discussions,
the Commission employed the phrase "decisionmaking capacity" to avoid the confusing im-
plications of the terms competence and incompetence. Id. at 56 n.5. For the purposes of this
Note, the terms "decisionmaking capacity" and "competence" are used interchangeably.
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disclosure of information. 160
To participate effectively in making health care decisions, the
patient must possess the proper mental, emotional, and legal capac-
ity.1 61 Decisionmaking capacity is a factual determination, based
upon findings that the patient: (1) possesses a "set of values and
goals;" (2) has the ability to "communicate and understand infor-
mation;" and (3) has the ability to reason and deliberate about his
choices.1 62 Each of these factors has an important purpose. Values
and goals help the patient weigh his decision within the proper
framework.1 63 The ability to communicate and understand the rele-
vant facts and alternatives is essential to a productive physician-
patient discourse regarding treatment. 16  Finally, the ability to rea-
son and deliberate shows that the patient is able to foresee the po-
tential impact of the selected treatment. 165 In essence, the ultimate
determination is whether the patient can "give reasons for the deci-
sion, in light of the facts, the alternatives, and the impact of the
decision on the patient's own goals and values." 166
The physician's assessment of a patient's decisionmaking capac-
ity is a difficult one to make, but may be eased by the rebuttable
legal presumption that every adult is competent, thus leaving it to
the challenger to demonstrate incompetency.1 67 Even where a pa-
tient's treatment decision differs from his treating physician's, the
presumption of competency continues. 168 At most, this difference
of opinion may indicate that the physician needs to scrutinize more
closely the implications of a patient's decision. 169 But when such an
160. Id. at 55. The doctrine of informed consent is rooted in the fundamental recognition
that adults have a right to self-determination. The concept was formulated as legal doctrine
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). Justice
Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at
129-30, 105 N.E. at 93. For additional background on the historical development of in-
formed consent as a legal doctrine, see 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157,
at 15-39; 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 1-35, 193-204.
161. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 55.
162. Id. at 57. These "elements of decisionmaking capacity" are not intended to be rig-
idly applied, and application should allow for individual idiosyncracies. However, when
these idiosyncracies are so distinct that they raise significant capacity questions in the profes-
sional's mind, the possibility of incompetence must be considered. Id. at n.6.
163. Id. at 57-58.
164. Id. at 58-59.
165. Id. at 59-60.
166. Id. at 60.
167. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
168. See I MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 62.
169. Id.
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evaluation "indicates that the patient understands the situation and
is capable of reasoning soundly about it, the patient's choice should
be accepted."'
171
The second element of informed consent requires that a patient's
health care deliberations and decisions be voluntary.1 71 The law will
regard consent obtained by any other means as invalid. 72 In a
health care setting, involuntary consent may result from three dif-
ferent actions taken by a physician: forced treatment, coerced treat-
ment, or manipulation. Although an uncommon occurrence in
mainstream health care, forced treatment is usually the result of an
assumption on the part of physicians that patients submit to treat-
ment upon admittance. 173 Although situations involving coerced
treatment also occur infrequently, they are most likely to arise when
there is a significant disparity between the positions of the patient
and the health care professional. The most common method by
which a physician might wrongly elicit a desired response is by
manipulating the facts so that the patient believes he has no other
choice. If a health care professional desires, he can control the pa-
tient by withholding, distorting, or overly emphasizing certain in-
formation. The potential for abuse is limited only by a physician's
sense of integrity. Because coercion and manipulation vitiate volun-
tariness, health care professionals are bound to a fundamental ethi-
cal obligation not to use these techniques. 74
The third element of informed consent is disclosure of informa-
When the consequences for well-being are substantial, there is a greater need to be
certain that the patient possesses the necessary level of capacity. When little turns
on the decision, the level of decisionmaking capacity required may appropriately be
reduced (even though the constituent elements remain the same) and less scrutiny
may be required. . . .Thus a particular patient may be capable of deciding about
a relatively inconsequential medication, but not about the amputation of a gangre-
nous limb.
Id. at 60.
170. Id. at 62. Conversely, when a physician determines that the patient may lack the
requisite decisionmaking capacity, he must take appropriate steps to insure that the patient's
interests are properly protected. Id. at 177-88.
171. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[T]he consent, to be
efficacious, must be free from imposition upon the patient.").
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 55-58, 892B (1979).
173. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 63-64. Generally speak-
ing, forced medical intervention is not consensual. In certain instances, however, society
legitimates such intervention. Societal sanction of forced medical intervention is justified by
pursuit of important social goals such as the promotion of public health (forced vaccinations)
and law enforcement (removing bullets needed as evidence). Id.
174. The extent of coercion exerted frequently depends on "the nature of a patient's ill-
nesses, the institutional setting, the personalities of the individuals involved, and several other
factors." The family is one other such factor which may coercively influence a patient's
decisionmaking. Id. at 66.
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tion. Disclosure is defined as "the actual communication between
patient and physician of the facts, values, doubts and alternatives in
which decisions must ultimately be based." '175 Communication is
intended to promote the twin objectives of all health care: im-
proved well-being and self-determination. 76 As the party with the
greater command of the information relevant to a patient's condi-
tion, the physician has a duty that includes disclosure of informa-
tion in an understandable manner.1 77 The test is "not what the
physician in his exercise of his medical judgment thinks a patient
should know before acquiescing in a proposed course of treatment;
rather the focus is on what data the patient requires in order to
make an intelligent decision."178 The professional and patient
should discuss three issues:
(1) the patient's current medical status, including its likely
course if no treatment is pursued; (2) the intervention(s) that
might improve the prognosis, including a description of the pro-
cedure(s) involved, a characterization of the likelihood and effect
of associated risks and benefits, and the likely course(s) with and
without therapy; and (3) a professional opinion, usually, as to the
best alternative. Furthermore, each of these elements must be
discussed in light of the associated uncertainties.1 79
Through a discussion of these issues, the physician not only meets a
current perspective favoring complete disclosure and open discus-
sion about a patient's diagnosis and prognosis, but he also provides
the patient with the opportunity to discuss alternative courses of
treatment for his condition. ° In this context, it is important to
note that while it is a physician's obligation to mention all approved
medical treatment alternatives available, 81 he need only discuss
them in a "fairly general way" until a more detailed evaluation of
the treatment options is warranted.1 82
In disseminating information to patients during the decision-
making process, physicians must also consider the role of uncer-
tainty in treatment18 3  and possible qualifications to full
175. Id. at 69.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 70.
178. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 442, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977).
179. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 74.
180. Id. at 76. A statistical study conducted during the course of the Commission's hear-
ings indicates that 94% of the patients polled reported that they wanted complete disclosure
in medical treatment. Id. at 75.
181. Id. at 75.
182. Id. at 77. When a physician openly discusses treatment options with the patient, he
also learns the patient's preferences and can better prescribe the measures to be taken. Id.
183. Id. at 86-87. The Commission identified five sources of uncertainty in medical deci-
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disclosure.18 4  Uncertainty in treatment is rarely communicated
openly, as both physicians and patients tend to refrain from a full
examination of this aspect of health care. 185 Yet, because it may
assist patients in making health care decisions, it is an integral facet
of informed consent. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the physician
to make the patient aware of any uncertainties involved in a particu-
lar treatment decision.
1 8 6
Arguably, there are five qualifications to the fundamental re-
quirement of full disclosure which serve as prerequisites to in-
formed consent. 1 87  Of these qualifications, or "exceptions to
informed consent," only that of waiver is directly applicable to the
health care decisionmaking process of competent patients. 188 The
courts have yet to consider whether an individual may waive his
right to informed consent and, in effect, instruct his physician that
"I will consent to this form of treatment but I do not want to know
anything about it."' 89 Courts may eventually recognize a patient's
waiver of disclosure of certain aspects of medical treatment, but it is
unlikely that they will grant individuals an unqualified right to
waive disclosure, yet still deem them capable of effectively partici-
pating in health care decisionmaking. 90 Thus, when confronted
with such a situation, a health care professional may be justifiably
reluctant to proceed further in the discussion of treatment with the
sionmaking: (1) limitations in current medical knowledge; (2) reliability of empirical infor-
mation; (3) likelihood of success in treatment; (4) limitations in the knowledge of the
particular health care provider; and (5) limitations inherent in an individual's ability to fore-
cast future impact of present-day treatment. Id.
184. Id. at 93.
185. Id. at 87-89.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 93. The five exceptions to informed consent are: (1) legal requirements; (2)
emergencies; (3) incompetency; (4) waiver; and (5) therapeutic privilege. Id.
188. Id. at 94-95. The remaining qualifications are inapplicable to the present discussion
because each situation obviates the need for informed consent and thus for determination of a
patient's competency. Where medical intervention is authorized by law, informed consent is
not required. In an emergency situation it is frequently impossible to obtain consent at all.
Even to the extent that it may be possible, the law overrides the requirement of consent prior
to treatment on the basis of exigent circumstances.
The ramifications of obtaining informed consent from an incompetent patient's surrogate
is not within the scope of this Note. Therapeutic privilege is so rarely considered a justifiable
basis for qualification of informed consent that its application should be precluded. Id. at 93-
96.
189. Id. at 94 (quoting Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
413, 459).
190. Id. at 94-95.
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patient. 191
The question of competency remains unwieldly in the abstract,
in part due to the different factual determinations that are necessar-
ily presented by each case. In Bartling, for example, the court de-
termined that the patient was competent to decide whether he
wanted to have the ventilator disconnected.192 The court based its
conclusion on evidence that Mr. Bartling executed a living will, a
durable power of attorney for health care, and a release of liability
for the hospital and its physicians, and that he was able to manifest
clearly and physically that he had an understanding that he needed
the ventilator to continue breathing.193 There was no issue whether
the real parties provided Mr. Bartling with the proper information
on which to base his consensual decision. All recognized that Mr.
Bartling was completely dependent upon the mechanical ventilator
to sustain his life and that he had clearly indicated his opposition to
such measures. Mr. Bartling competently and capably withdrew his
consent to treatment. 94 The decision was complete, and the real
parties were to comply with his wishes. The court of appeals prop-
erly determined that William Bartling should be disconnected from
the ventilator.
B. Balancing Competing Interests
Upon determining that a patient is capable of participating effec-
tively in health care decisionmaking, a court should apply the sec-
ond part of the Bartling analysis to evaluate the competing interests.
The interest of a competent adult patient to self-determination in
medical treatment1 95 must be balanced against the state interest to
preserve life. 1
96
The right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treat-
ment1 97 should be honored for two reasons. First, recognition of
191. At this point, a physician would be confronted with three options. First, he may
proceed despite the waiver and risk eventually facing charges of assault. Second, he may
refuse to continue in this relationship, absent the patient's willingness to hear at least the
most fundamental aspects of the considered treatment. Third, in the best possible situation,
the physician will attempt to elicit why the patient refuses to be informed of a particular
medical procedure's guidelines and work with the patient to the point where that patient has
a sufficient understanding of the treatment contemplated, yet not so much that it would vio-
late the patient's initial request to be spared such disclosures.
192. 163 Cal. App. 3d at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.
193. Id.
194. Id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
195. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
197. See DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 157, at 44
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the patient's right to self-determination acknowledges that the pa-
tient is best suited to determine which course of action will best
promote his well-being.198 Second, respect for the patient's right to
self-determination promotes maintenance of his "freedom from in-
terference" as well as his "creative self-agency." '199 The right to
self-determination, however, is not unqualified.
An individual's right to refuse medical treatment may be tem-
pered by the state's interest in requiring treatment. A state may
assert four interests in advocating a patient's continued treatment:
preservation of life, protection of innocent third parties, prevention
of suicide, and preservation of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.2"° The most significant of these state interests is preser-
vation of life. This consideration is strongest when a particular case
involves a patient who, despite the potential for a return to a normal
life with life saving treatment, refuses such treatment. 2 1 Further,
since the preservation of life is a fundamental tenet of the Hippo-
cratic Oath, the physician's code of ethics, the disconnection of life
support systems is considered inconsistent with medicine's
purposes.20 2
There are several countervailing considerations regarding the
utility of arguments based on the interest of preserving life. First,
and foremost, the right of a competent adult patient to self-determi-
nation is paramount to the interests of the hospital and doctors.2 3
Second, when the patient is dying, "the state's interest in the pro-
longing of life must be reconciled with the patient's interest in re-
n.4; Cantor, A Patient's Decision To Refuse Life-Saving Medical TreatmenL" Bodily Integrity
versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228 (1973); Annas & Densberger, supra
note 158, at 561-66.
198. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
199. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 45-47. A patient's
"freedom from interference," and his "creative self-agency" are often considered components
to the definition of a patient's "autonomy." See, e.g., Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed
Consent in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 157, at 70-72.
200. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370
N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); accord Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
201. Cf. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009-
10 (D.C. Cir.) (patient refused necessary blood transfusion on religious grounds; court noted
that because death was the result of a religious choice, the state's interest would prevail over
patient whose "life hung in the balance"), rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
202. The Hippocratic Oath provides in relevant part: "I will prescribe regiment for the
good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.
To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death."
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 680 (24th ed. 1965).
203. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:764
BARTLING V. SUPERIOR COURT
jecting the traumatic cost of that prolongation." 2" Third, health
care professionals are now beginning to realize that with each ad-
vance in medical technology, man is capable of being maintained
"in life" for greater and greater lengths of time. 05 Certainly at the
point where the maintenance of life by invasive, mechanical means
subsumes all quality of life, then the individual's right overcomes
the state interest.2 06 Fourth, the scarcity and ever-increasing cost of
the medical instruments required for life sustaining treatment will
inevitably lead to difficult decisions of resource allocation. Society's
interest in the preservation of life may soon be outweighed by the
economic necessity that it allocate its resources only to those pa-
tients with a reasonable potential for survival.
The second asserted state interest lies in the protection of inno-
cent third-party interests. Traditionally, an individual's right to re-
fuse medical treatment has been subordinated to the state's interest
in requiring treatment where exercise of the right to refuse treat-
ment may adversely affect his children.2" 7 Where continued treat-
ment fails to alter a patient's prognosis, however, the state's interest
in protection of innocent third parties is no longer predominant.
Rather, the individual's right is more important when the continued
treatment of a dying patient would only serve to impact adversely
on the surviving members of his family. 08
The third asserted state interest, the prevention of suicide, is a
corollary to the interest in the preservation of life. Health care pro-
fessionals placed in the position of complying with a patient's re-
quest to terminate life support systems have frequently refused to
honor this request, arguing that to do so would be tantamount to
aiding and abetting in a patient's suicide.20 9 However, no modem
court considering a patient's right to refuse life sustaining treatment
has ever held that such a decision constituted suicide.E10 In fact,
204. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
205. See DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 157, at 1.
206. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664; see In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634,
405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980).
207. The leading case in this area is In re President and Directors of Georgetown College,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
208. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737-38, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
209. See supra note 201 and accompanying text; see generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 74 at 570-71 (1972) (discussing criminality of aiding
suicide).
210. In re Quinlan is the seminal case on this point. The Quinlan court distinguished
between "the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life-
support or radical surgery . . in the face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent
death." 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.
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several courts have expressly or implicitly rejected arguments which
likened the refusal of life sustaining medical treatment to suicide.2 1
There are two prerequisites to a finding of suicide-specific intent
and causation.21 2 According to the courts, an incurably ill patient
who refuses medical treatment usually lacks the specific intent to
die.213 Even assuming he had the intent, these courts say, the pa-
tient did not set into motion the natural processes that ultimately
cause death.214
The fourth state interest concerns preservation of the ethical in-
tegrity of medical practice. A traditional goal of medicine is to pro-
long life.215  Advances in medical technology have created
situations which were never thought possible, and which will re-
quire careful reformulation of the goals of health care decisions in
the context of terminally ill patients,216 with some provision for the
recognition that "the dying are more often in need of comfort than
treatment. ' 21 7 The laws of many states currently preclude criminal
or civil liability for the termination of life sustaining treatment of
incurably ill patients,218 and indeed, a physician or other health care
professional may be held liable for failing to honor a patient's re-
quest to terminate treatment. 21 9 As medical advances have thrust
practitioners into the twenty-first century, so must the medical-ethi-
cal framework prescribe conduct that is appropriate to these
advances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Today it is clear that a competent adult patient has the right to
refuse necessary medical treatment. Yet the cases dealing with this
issue reveal pervasive inconsistency in interpretation and confusion
in application of the relevant principles. A uniform standard of
211. See, eg., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741-43 & n. 11, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26 & n. 11; Satz,
362 So. 2d at 162-63.
212. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.l1, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11; Satz, 362 So. 2d at
162-63; see generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 209, at § 74 (discussing ele-
ments and criminality of suicide).
213. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11; Satz, 362 So. 2d
at 162-63.
214. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E. 2d at 426 n. 11; Satz, 362 So. 2d
at 162-63.
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
216. See DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 157, at 1.
217. Id. at 11-12.
218. Such provisions are especially evident in states which already have right-to-die stat-
utes. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1985).
219. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
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analysis would ideally integrate the rights of competent adult pa-
tients in health care decisionmaking with current medical and ethi-
cal perspectives which take into account future advances in health
care.
The approach taken by the appellate court in Bartling is a useful
model for future cases involving the right to refuse medical treat-
ment. The Bartling analysis should be applied in any case where an
adult patient expresses his desire to refuse medical treatment. The
threshold inquiry entails evaluation of the individual's capacity to
refuse treatment. Upon a finding of competency, the patient's inter-
ests in self-determination must be balanced against the contrary
state interests asserted. Absent evidence of significant counter-
vailing considerations, the patient must be granted the freedom to
exercise his right. This approach is the most responsible means of
reconciling the powerful conflicting interests in these cases.
JOHN L. CAPONE
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